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As a matter of fact, people cooperate most of the time. Individuals are remarkably 
good at avoiding conflict and acting or working together for their mutual benefit 
and for the common benefit of the group to which they belong.  While also other 
organisms, like plants or animals, do cooperate both with other members of their 
own species and with members of other species, only humans are systematically 
cooperative to such a high degree, and only human society depends so deeply on 
cooperation among its members for its very existence (Bowles and Gintis 2011, 
Nowak 2011). 
Confronted with the plain fact that people cooperate, scholars have faced 
significant difficulties in explaining why and how exactly they cooperate. The 
problem of cooperation has indeed turned out to be a surprisingly complex 
challenge for many different disciplines, including philosophy, economics, and 
behavioral sciences. Today, the study of cooperation is an active, highly 
interdisciplinary enterprise which draws upon the results of at least anthropology, 
evolutionary biology, psychology, sociology, political science, mathematics, 
computer science, and complex systems. As a result, it is virtually impossible to 
find in the literature a coherent, unified perspective explaining the nature and the 
many different aspects of human cooperation. Interestingly, various theoretical 
attempts in different fields seem to share a kind of “explanatory deficit” 
concerning cooperation: according to the best theories accepted in those field, 
individuals should not cooperate, or at least not to the degree to which they in fact 
cooperate.  
For instance, as Darwin (1871) himself acknowledged, human cooperation is a 
puzzle for evolutionary theory, since natural selection should hinder, and not 
favor, cooperative or “altruistic” behavior — which is inefficient, in biological 
terms, as compared to non-cooperative or “selfish” strategies. Today, there are at 
least five different hypotheses explaining how the evolution of cooperation took 
place (Nowak 2006, 2012) in the first place, including a revival of Darwin’s own 
“group selection” hypothesis (cooperation increases the fitness of groups, although 
reducing the individual fitness; see Sober and Wilson 1999). 
 
1 Thanks are due to Pierpaolo Marrone for inviting me to act as guest editor for this issue of 
Ethics & Politics, to the referees for their assistance, and to Roberto Festa and Luca Tambolo 
for useful discussions on the topics of this issue.  
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Another puzzling perspective on cooperation comes from economics. At first 
glance, economic theory may be regarded as the science of cooperation: from Adam 
Smith (1776) to Friedrich von Hayek (1973-79), scholars have devoted a lot of 
attention to the “invisible hand” mechanisms that spontaneously coordinate the 
“selfish” actions of many different individuals into unplanned, yet beneficial 
social orders. Money, languages, the law, and the market itself are all examples of 
cooperative social institutions which spontaneously emerge from the complex 
interaction among the members of society. Yet, when the micro-dynamics of 
human action is analyzed trough the lenses of rational choice theory – the basic 
tool of modern economics – spontaneous cooperation becomes inexplicable, due to 
the existence of social dilemmas. Social dilemmas seem to be everywhere, from the 
provision of public goods to the exploitation of natural resources. In all such 
situations, individual interest seems at odds with the desired social outcome: since 
each member of the group has an incentive to defect (i.e., to not cooperate), 
rational choice theory seems unable to explain how cooperation is indeed possible. 
Asking whether — or, better, under what conditions – it is rational to 
cooperate, or not, is just a different way to tackle the problem of cooperation, the 
one favored by philosophers interested in the study of human choices and 
decisions. One of the central problems here, as well as in ethics and political 
philosophy, is how norms of cooperation, and other “pro-social” conventions and 
behavioral rules, emerge and spread from individual actions (cf. Bicchieri and 
Muldoon 2011). While most of the work in this area has been done by philosophers 
of science — like David Lewis (1969) and, more recently, Brian Skyrms (2004) and 
Cristina Bicchieri (2006) —, it took some time to apply such kind of analysis to 
science as an example of cooperative enterprise. Only with the work of Alvin 
Goodman (1999) and Philip Kitcher (1990) in the eighties, philosophers started 
studying in a systematic way the collective dimension of scientific and ordinary 
knowledge. Today’s (formal) social epistemology explores different mechanisms of 
knowledge creation and aggregation — like consensus formation, the division of 
cognitive labor, the “free market” of ideas, and others – in order to assess their 
relevance for the aims of scientific inquiry.  
The six contributions to this special issue all rely on the above perspectives to 
discuss different aspects of cooperation. The first two contributions, respectively 
by Jesús Zamora Bonilla and by Gregor Betz, Michael Baurmann, and Rainer 
Cramm, study the role of cooperative norms and consensus reaching practices in 
the process of (scientific) knowledge formation. The papers by Ruggero Rangoni 
and Matthias Greiff stem from the research program on the evolution of 
cooperation inspired by Robert Axelrod’s pioneering work in evolutionary game 
theory. Such tradition is discussed also in the last two papers of the issue, by 
Hannes Rusch and Eckhart Arnold, but only to criticize, from different 
perspectives, both its adequacy and its methodological soundness. In the 
following, a brief description of the content of each paper is given. 
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According to a widespread metaphor, which goes back at least to John Stuart 
Mill (1848), scientific inquiry, and rational discussion in general, can be viewed as 
a free market where ideas, hypotheses, and theories are traded, and knowledge 
and methods emerge from the interaction of individual scientists or groups of 
researchers. In recent times, such metaphor gave rise to a new research program, 
known as “the economics of scientific knowledge” (Zamora Bonilla 2012), which 
applies rational choice theory, game theory, and the other standard tools of 
modern economics to the analysis of scientific inquiry and progress. Following this 
line of research, in his paper Cooperation, Competition, and the Contractarian View 
of Scientific Research, Zamora Bonilla deploys a game-theoretic reconstruction of 
the idea of a social contract to shed light on the nature and role of methodological 
norms in science. Within such approach, scientists are viewed as self-interested 
rational agents, which strive to maximize their own reputation, i.e., recognition 
by their epistemic peers in the scientific community. To this purpose, they have 
first to agree on what may be called a “methodological contract”, specifying the 
rules of the “game of science” according to which achievements are acknowledged 
and assessed, and reputation is allocated among agents. As the author argues, 
such contractarian approach to scientific methodology can account for both the 
institutional and the cognitive aspects of scientific inquiry, thus capturing some of 
the best insights of both sociological and “rationalistic” philosophy of science.    
As Zamora Bonilla points out at the beginning of his paper, cooperation is 
central in science for at least two reasons. First, because inquiry is an essentially 
collaborative enterprise: today, the lab, more than the single scientist, seems to be 
the main character of scientific research. Second, and more importantly, because 
science relies on trust among scientists, and trust is itself a form of “cognitive” or 
“epistemic” cooperation. In Is Epistemic Trust of Veritistic Value?, Betz, 
Baurmann and Cramm focus precisely on this kind of cooperation. The paper is a 
contribution to the field of what Goldman (1999) called “veristic” social 
epistemology, i.e., the analysis of the social and cognitive practices of scientific 
communities with respect to their ability of tracking the truth, construed as the 
main epistemic goal of inquiry. The authors apply, perhaps for the first time, a 
simulation-based model of opinion dynamics to the assessment of the veristic 
value of trust and competence ascription. Such an approach provides a fresh look 
to a growing research field which links models of opinion dynamics and belief 
merging, on the one hand, and models of truth approximation or verisimilitude, 
on the other hand (see, e.g., Betz 2012, Cevolani 2013).  
As mentioned earlier, evolutionary biologists and economists face the problem 
of explaining how cooperation is possible at all, given that in many situations the 
incentives of individual agents pull in the opposite direction. A standard answer 
comes from the work by political scientist Robert Axelrod (1984), who used 
computer simulations to argue that spontaneous cooperation is indeed possible 
even within communities of purely self-interested individuals (like, for instance, 
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the recognition-seeking scientists studied in Zamora Bonilla’s paper). Axelrod – 
whose approach is reviewed and discussed in Rangoni’s, Rusch’s and Arnold’s 
papers – showed that when individuals are repeatedly involved over time in a 
prisoner’s dilemma (the canonical formal model of a social dilemma), simple 
cooperative strategies (like “I’ll cooperate with you if you cooperate with me”) are 
likely to emerge and spread in the population, marginalizing and possibly 
eliminating non-cooperative behavior. Axelrod’s simulations provoked an 
enormous amount of discussion, to which the last four papers in this issue further 
contribute. 
In Heterogeneous Strategy Learning in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Rangoni 
aims at improving simulation-based explanations of social cooperation by further 
investigating how cooperative strategies may spread in a population. In the 
standard models, at each round of interaction individuals change their own 
strategy just by observing the most successful strategy in the previous round, and 
adopting it. This is a straightforward learning mechanism, and yet a somehow 
simplistic one. As Rangoni suggests, more realistic models should pay attention to 
the specific way in which different agents learn and adopt new strategies. His 
proposal is based on the so-called “consumat approach”, designed by Wander 
Jager and Marco Janssen to study heterogeneous behavioral patterns in multi-
agent simulations. Applying this approach to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
leads to an evolutionary dynamics characterized by different learning mechanisms 
for different kinds of agents. Intuitively, individuals can be more or less satisfied 
of their own track record and more or less willing to change their own strategy. 
The outcome of the simulation ran by the author is significantly different from 
the standard case, showing a much greater heterogeneity of behavior in the final 
population, where cooperative strategies co-exist with less cooperative or non-
cooperative ones.   
Learning is also the focus of Greiff’s paper, Learning with whom to Interact: A 
Public Good Game on a Dynamic Network. A typical example of social dilemma, 
and the one probably most studied by economists, is the provision of public goods. 
The defining features of a public good are such that every one in a group is better 
off if the good is provided, but no one is rationally interested in contributing to its 
production. For this reason, according to standard game-theoretical analysis, 
public goods could never be produced spontaneously – i.e., without an external 
authority which can force each individual in the group to contribute. Yet, both 
historical and empirical evidence (Greiff refers in particular to Elinor Ostrom’s 
work on self-organizing societies) shows that in many cases groups are able to 
provide most of the public goods they need even in absence of such an authority, 
thanks to a number of social norms prescribing cooperative behavior. Still, from 
the theoretical standpoint, the very existence of such social norms raises a 
“second-order” social dilemma: where do social norms come from? Since a social 
norm is itself a kind of second-order public good, by the same pattern of reasoning 
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it seems impossible that it can be spontaneously created and maintained. Greiff 
employs a simulation-based evolutionary model to show how a group of self-
interested individuals can endow itself with the social norms necessary to sustain 
the provision of the required (first-order) public goods. Here, learning plays a 
crucial role in instructing agents on how to exclude free-riders by rewarding 
cooperators and sanctioning defectors. The model, the author argues, can explain 
the emergence of norms of cooperation and hence the spontaneous provision of 
public goods in substantial agreement with the available empirical evidence.  
This kind of simulation-based explanations of the emergence and evolution of 
cooperation is critically discussed in the last two papers of this issue. In What 
Niche did Human Cooperativeness Evolve in?, Rusch questions the relevance and 
adequacy of the prisoner’s dilemma in the study of how cooperation emerged in 
the first place. As the author notes, the payoff structure of this game, which 
implies that mutual defection is the only possible outcome of interaction, is very 
peculiar and extremely unlikely to obtain in real-life situations. It follows that 
only strong empirical evidence could justify the use of the prisoner’s dilemma as 
the canonical model of interaction in the study of the origins of cooperative 
behavior. Such evidence, however, is missing, given that both experimental 
results and evidence concerning animals and humans suggest that ancestral 
cooperative behavior was much more widespread than is usually assumed. In 
turn, this suggests that other kinds of games, allowing at least the possibility of a 
cooperative outcome, may provide a better explanation of how cooperation 
emerged in ancient human societies – an example being the “stag hunt” game 
studied by Skyrms (2004).  
A different critique of the standard approach to the study of the evolution of 
cooperation is provided by Arnold in Simulation Models of the Evolution of 
Cooperation as Proofs of Logical Possibilities. How Useful Are They? The author’s 
main thesis is that one cannot draw general empirical conclusions from theoretical 
simulations, and hence that it is very hard to assess the value of Axelrod-like 
purported explanations of social cooperation. As an example, Arnold contrasts 
two simulation-based explanations of social phenomena: Axelrod’s explanation of 
the evolution of cooperation and Schelling’s (1971) well-known explanation of 
racial segregation. Only in the latter case, Arnold argues, it is possible, at least in 
principle, to empirically identify the mechanisms at work in the real-world 
situations that the simulation aims at modeling. On the contrary, Axelrod’s 
models provide at best a mere proof of “logical possibility”, i.e., allow one to 
conclude that the outcome of the simulations is a possible outcome of the real-
world interaction. Yet, empirical confirmation of this kind of explanations is very 
hard to provide and, according to the author, very unlikely to be found for 
Axelrod-like models. Thus, further work, and a closer look at the empirical and 
historical evidence, is needed in order to make the simulation-based approach to 
the study of social cooperation really worth pursuing. 
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